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“In policy debates over migration in western Europe, we see the conflation of the idea of 
‘immigrant’ and even ‘refugee’ with ideas of crime, especially drug trafficking, robbery and 
prostitution. The ‘problem-centered’ view of black people and other dispossessed minorities 
is dominant in debates on immigration and asylum, whilst racism and neo-fascism, though 
duly deplored, are inevitable if numbers are not restricted. Rather than seeing racism as a 
problem for all the citizens of Europe, we are locked in to seeing minorities and migrants as 
a problem for Europe (…).”1 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the Eurobarometer, migration is seen as an issue, which ranks 
higher than terrorism2. Immigration is a nexus area in the EU, partly because 
it has links with the labour market, partly because it is related to debates 
about national identity (and indirectly the loss of national sovereignty). 
Immigration is increasingly perceived as a worrying, even destabilizing 
phenomenon. To a large extent, as has also been analysed by Bigo, Den 
Boer, Huysmans, Loader3 and others, migration has been subject of a 
securitisation process. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that an object or 
phenomenon (e.g. migratory movements) can never be a threat by itself. A 
security actor or “securitising” actor4 is required to define something as a 
threat. Moreover, securitisation is essentially an inter-subjective process5, in 
which actors share the interpretation of an object being defined as a threat. 
My thesis would therefore be that we require discursive vehicles for the 
promotion of shared positive and negative security notions: politics, the 
                                                
∗ This article is an adapted version of the plenary lecture presented to the Swiss Forum for Migration and 
Population Studies, Bern, 1 September 2006. Monica den Boer is Academic Dean at the Police Academy 
of The Netherlands and Professor of Comparative Public Administration, in particular the 
Internationalization of the Police Function, at the VU University Amsterdam. 
1 B. Hudson, ‘Racism and Criminology: Concepts and Controversies’, in: D. Cook & B. 
Hudson, Racism & Criminology, Londen: Sage 1993, p. 24. 
2 A. Luedtke, ‘European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy. Testing the 
Impact of National Identity’, European Union Politics, (6) 2005, p. 84. 
3 E.g. J. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, Routledge: 
New York 2006; I. Loader, ‘Policing, Securitization and democratization in Europe’, 
Criminology and Criminal Justice (2) 2002-2; M. den Boer, ‘Crime et immigration dans l'Union 
européenne’, Culture et Conflits, “Sécurité et Immigration”, 1998-31/32: M. den Boer, ‘Moving 
between bogus and bona fide: the policing of inclusion and exclusion in Europe’, in: R. 
Miles & D. Thränhardt (eds.), Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and 
Exclusion, London: Pinter Publishers 1995. 
4 B. Buzan, O. Waever & J. de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998, p. 40. 
5 Idem, p. 30. 
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media and leading institutions can be seen as major transmitters of the (de-) 
securitisation process.  
 
Anxiety seems to be one of the core drivers of current domestic and 
European politics, and has visibly given a strong impetus to private security 
business worldwide.6 Yet, as we have seen with the ratification of the new 
Treaty on European Union, anxiety can also become an obstacle in further 
integration. The Anxiety Society, which now emerges is symbiotic with the 
Risk Society7. In the risk society, crisis and catastrophy – being the exceptional 
condition – become the norm8. Nowadays, the fight against terrorism – 
whether incidental or structural in nature – has become a widely accepted 
norm in the organization of safety and security. The perception of risk and 
anxiety is based on a perceived erosion of security and trust, and on the 
exposure to a society which has turned more anonymous and more 
globalised. To some extent, the Anxiety Society is based on the reflective 
notion of a ‘safety utopia’9, a society in which citizens can live in mutual 
peace, trust, and solidarity. 
 
A crucial element in the debate about the road towards a new society is 
whether safety is an ideal within reach, or a utopian illusion, which is 
impossible to achieve. It can thus be concluded that the anxiety about 
migration issues has been framed as an issue for domestic politicians who 
seek to reinforce national identity at the expense of migrant populations. 
Beck argues that the utopia of a risk society remains peculiarly negative and 
defensive: “Basically, one is no longer concerned with attaining something 
‘good’, but rather with preventing the worst; (…)”.10 Jackson11 paraphrases the 
perspective of the anxiety society as individuals “…prone to moral panics 
and increased anxiety about a vast array of potential and actual dangers…”, 
in response to which “public officials have taken up the role of societal risk 
managers..”. Solidarity, which arises from anxiety becomes the new binding 
political force. 
Security care providers and security managers may well benefit from the 
sweet and sour mix between the many popular assumptions about the axis 
between migration and security. Folk devils and moral panics about crime 
                                                
6 C. Holmqvist, Private Security Companies. The Case for Regulation. Stockholm: SIPRI 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), January 2005.  
7 U. Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage Publications 1992. See also J. 
Young, The Exclusive Society, London: Sage 2006, who mentions six components of risk, 
namely 1) a real rise in risk; 2) the world we experience as risky is revealed as risky on a 
wider and wider scale in all areas and parts of the social fabric; 3) rising expectations; 4) less 
predictability of behaviour due to greater mobility and a decline of communities; 5) the 
problematisation of risk itself; 6) the public assessment of risk due to mass media spreading 
a plethora of images of crime and deviance. 
8 R. Jackson, ‘An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse Post-September 11’, 
Cambridge Review on International Affairs ( 20) 2007. 
9 H. Boutellier, De veiligheidsutopie: Hedendaags onbehagen en verlangen rond misdaad en straf, Den 
Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2002. 
10 Beck 1992, supra note 7, p. 49. 
11 Jackson 2007, supra note 8. 
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and insecurity are easily dispersed around the world, in which the mass media 
play a crucial role.12 Politics, in turn, can play a role in the amplification of 
difference and perpetual demonising of selected sub-communities. As Young 
says, given the strong performative power of speech, perceived deviance 
become real deviance. “Criminalisation itself is an important feature of the 
discourse of exclusion”.13 
 
The question is also how we seek to analyse the issue, i.e. which lens we 
would like to adopt for the interpretation of certain phenomena. In various 
law enforcement discourses, migrants are primarily seen as (potential and 
real) perpetrators of crime, but recent studies show that migrants themselves 
are also victims of crime. Intra-group crimes and hate crimes with racist 
motives illustrate the type of criminality to which immigrants may fall prey.14 
There is also a link between crime and unsafe areas, and these are the 
locations where many immigrants live; there are studies which demonstrate 
that immigrants are victim of theft and burglary, almost as often as many 
indigenous Dutch inhabitants. 
 
The selective look tends to prevail however. Popular assumptions about the 
nexus between migration and security are easily transmitted and turned into 
wide spread beliefs in times when societies are fundamentally fragile and fluid 
in terms of identity and economic well being. In Europe, more widely, the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has become a potent umbrella 
for the harbouring of hybrid security notions, or the inter-connection 
between security, crime and immigration. The AFSJ accommodates a 
“security continuum”15, in which migration is regarded as a meta-propeller 
for many different problems. On top of this, the European Union has 
projected itself as a potentially powerful actor, which jumps into a control-
deficit and which advocates its potential as a coordinating actor.16 
 
 
I. Europe: Lingering between Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants 
 
The current trend of excluding migrants from entry into Europe may 
crystallise by reiterating clustered differences between immigrant and non-
immigrant, integrated and non-integrated, employed and unemployed, 
                                                
12 Young 2006, supra note 7, p. 128f. 
13 D. Cook, ‘Racism, Citizenship and Exclusion’, in: D. Cook & Barbara Hudson (eds.), 
Racism & Criminology, Londen: Sage 1993, p. 156. 
14 F. Bovenkerk & Douwe Korf, ‘Allochtonen als slachtoffer van criminaliteit’, Delikt en 
Delinkwent 2006, aftl. 6/43. 
15 D. Bigo, ‘The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a newly 
developing area of police intervention’, in: M. Anderson & M. den Boer (eds)., Policing 
Across National Boundaries, London: Pinter 1994, p. 164. 
16 S. Sterkx, De alomvattende benadering van migratie. Een discourstheoretisch en –analytisch onderzoek 
naar de externe dimensie van het asiel- en migratiebeleid van de Europese Unie, Antwerpen 2006, p. 58 
(op cit Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of migration’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, (38) 2000-5). 
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criminal and non-criminal, and Muslim and secular. In addition, we seem to 
be moving from an “inclusive society of stability and homogeneity to an 
exclusive society of change and division”.17 According to Young18, “(…), the 
excluded create divisions amongst themselves, frequently on ethnic lines, 
(…)”.   “The dialectics of exclusion is in process, a deviancy amplification which 
progressively accentuates marginality, a Pyrrhic process involving both wider 
society and, crucially, the actors themselves which traps them in, at best, a 
series of dead end jobs and at worst, an underclass of idleness and 
desperation.”19 This trend undermines the self-confidence of immigrant 
groups, who even feel diminished by the societal resistance, which they 
encounter.20 
 
The rise of exclusiveness is an undercurrent process in the construction of 
the deviant other in late modernity, as Young puts it, and crime certainly has 
an impact on those patterns of exclusion. The security industry, “whose very 
job is exclusion”, contributes to defensive exclusion in the form of e.g. gated 
communities.21 The “actuarial cordon sanitaire” separates the world of the 
losers from that of the winners; life is made more tolerable for the winners 
while the losers are being “scapegoated”.22 The deviant other thus becomes 
spatially and socially segregated: “Crime itself is an exclusion as are the 
attempts to control it by barriers, incarceration and stigmatization. Such 
processes often exacerbate the problem in a dialectic of exclusion: (…)”23 (id. 
2006 (1999): 26). Van den Brink24 regards this as a phenomenon of cultural 
and ethnic segregation, culminating in the withdrawal of members of migrant 
                                                
17 Young 2006, supra note 7, p. vi. 
18 Idem, p. 12. 
19 Idem, p. 13.  
20 See e.g. F. Buijs, ‘Bij Marokkaan zit gevoel van vernedering diep’, NRC Handelsblad, 14 
June 2006; see also R. Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, 
Oxon: Ashgate 2008. 
21 Young 2006, supra note 7, p. 20. 
22 Idem, p. 21. 
23 Young 2006, supra note 7, p. 26. 
24 G. van den Brink, Culturele Contrasten. Het verhaal van de migranten in Rotterdam.  Amsterdam: 
Bert Bakker 2006. “Of het nu gaat om woonwijken of om het basisonderwijs, om de 
huwelijksmarkt of het besteden van de vrije tijd – overal doet zich een proces van 
ontmenging voor, waarbij mensen met vergelijkbare voorkeuren op het gebied van 
levensstijl elkaar opzoeken. (…): wereldwijde processen van migratie en vermenging leiden 
tot schurende beschavingen omdat culturele diversiteit door veel gewone burgers niet 
aantrekkelijk of zelfs onwenselijk gevonden wordt.” (p. 20); “Voor veel bewoners van 
Rotterdam kan de toename van het aantal kleuren wel eens tot het beeld van een ‘geschifte’ 
stad leiden., dat wil zeggen een samenleving waar de verschillende kleuren met elkaar 
vloeken of in elk geval slecht bij elkaar passen. Dat heeft een nadelige invloed op de 
leefbaarheid en veiligheid in de stad.”(p. 285). In another chapter in the same volume, Loes 
Verplanke observes that there is a lot of bonding within the ethnic communities, but hardly 
any bridging with the native urban community: bridging seems to be a bridge too far in 
Van den Brink 2006, p. 193. “Wil men op het niveau van de civil society tegenwicht bieden 
aan het ‘schiften’ van de stad, dan zou men vooral die activiteiten en verenigingen moeten 
steunen waar de nadruk op bridging wordt gelegd, en niet op bonding.’, Van den Brink 2006, 
p. 289. 
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communities into their own ethnic “zones”. A radical translation of this is 
the emergence of transnational tribalisation: ethnic communities which are 
dispersed throughout the world, but who keep in contact with each other 
through informal communication structures and informal economies (like 
the hawala banking system). These may be seen as a side effect of 
globalisation, but at the same time combine a new type of separatism.25 
 
Certain criminological theories put forward the suggestion that crime and 
deviance occur because of the lack of inclusion in a given society. As Young 
says: “Crime occurs because of a deficit of culture.”26 Another theory (the deficit 
model) suggests that crime occurs because of a lack of inclusion in the 
economy, i.e. because of material deprivation. In either case, non-integrated 
(mostly young, male) immigrants tend to be overrepresented in crime 
statistics. Seen from this perspective, social, cultural and economic exclusion, 
combined with geographical segregation, raises the chances of insecurity and 
crime. But according to Young, the significance of subcultures may be higher 
than that of segregated communities: seen from a societal perspective, 
subcultures cannot be hermetically separate in an interrelated society. 
Subcultures, which occur throughout society, are the “differently accentuated 
interpretations of the wider values which vary by age, class, gender and 
ethnicity.”27 Such a theory would lend itself for a more positive appreciation 
of the position of migrants in western societies, whose ethnic cultures may 
either stay or disappear. Crime and deviance are patterns, which occur on the 
seams and overlaps between subcultures: crime occurs where relative 
deprivation is highest and this happens mostly where there is a degree of 
assimilation.28 Several recent publications argue that marginalisation of 
immigrants in societies can be seen as one of the root causes of skepticism 
and radicalisation. And those phenomena are, in themselves, perceived as a 
threat to state security: “Ensuring citizenship based on security is therefore a 
pre-condition to State security, or better, an intrinsic part of State security.”29 
 
Hence, from a state security perspective, radicalisation is regarded as a 
worrisome issue. Annual reports of national security services contain 
indications of growing groups of “alienated citizens”, who create links with 
inner bases for the purpose of recruitment.30 In Leiken’s terminology, we are 
                                                
25 A. Bakas, Megatrends Europe. The Future of the Continent And Its Impact on the World, London: 
Cyan Books 2006, p. 43: “In Churchtown swearing is prohibited; in Little Arabia it is 
forbidden to sunbathe topless in your garden and a headscarf is obligatory for women, in 
Gaytown, open sexual behaviour is completely accepted and this in turn gives rise to 
excesses of hedonistic cultural life, including a rich artistic life and a red-light district; on 
the edge of the Goldcoast, you are frisked before you are allowed to enter.” (p. 43f). 
26 Young 2006, supra note 7, p. 79. 
27 Idem, p. 90. 
28 Young 2006, supra note 7 p. 93. 
29 C. Sokoloff & R. Lewis, Denial of Citizenship – A Challenge to Human Security, Issue Paper 
28, European Policy Centre, 1 April 2005, p. 4. 
30 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), Dynamiek in islamitisch activisme. 
Aanknopingspunten voor Democratisering en Mensenrechten, Amsterdam University Press 2006, p. 
151, referring to O. Roy, Globalized Islam. The Search of a New Ummah, London: Hurst & 
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talking here of a dramatic instance of “adversarial assimilation – integration 
into the host country’s adversarial culture.”31 Seen from this perspective, 
integration policy is not merely a question of active implementation, but also 
of discouraging trends that may be counterproductive to the social 
integration of immigrant communities. Or, on a slightly larger scale, Western 
societies ought to become more self-confident and less defensive. The 
moderate Islam movement propagates a Europe, which embraces a strategy, 
which deconstructs and decouples the explosive inter-linkage between 
insecurity, migration and unemployment, shifting the attention towards 
constructive actions (education, employment, emancipation).32 
 
 
II. European Citizenship and Inclusiveness 
 
Integration policy is more a matter of citizenship than of nationality, but the 
denial of nationality leads to the deprivation of citizenship. Worldwide, it is 
claimed, millions of people continue to live without the benefits of 
citizenship.33 The denial of citizenship may be regarded as a challenge to 
Human Security. The 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security 
defines human security expansively as covering “the vital core of all human 
lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.” The 
safety and dignity of the individual human person are crucial values, as 
opposed to the power and authority of the state. Protection and 
empowerment are essential benefits to be gained from citizenship. Non-
citizens cannot benefit from human rights as much as citizens, which is due 
to their economic, social, political and legal marginalisation. 
 
Young advocates a new contract of citizenship which “emphasizes diversity 
rather than absolute values, and which sees such diversity not as a catalogue 
of fixed features but as a plethora of cultures, ever changing, ever 
developing, transforming themselves and each other.” Such would not 
constitute a citizenship of rights but one of reciprocity between citizens and 
which fully recognises the reciprocity between state and citizens in “the 
enactment of social goals and institutional change.”34 
 
When we transpose this discussion to migrants who live in Europe, the status 
of undocumented migrants is an issue that academics and policy-makers 
should be concerned about. Often, they are not included as a target group of 
integration – let alone immigration – policies. Undocumented migrants have 
basic human rights, and the nation states are required to protect those rights. 
                                                                                                                              
Company 2004; R. S. Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, Foreign Affairs 2005 July/August, 
p. 120. 
31 Leiken 2005, supra note 30, p. 127. 
32 T. Ramadan, ‘Europa is hard toe aan een revolutie van het vertrouwen’, De Volkskrant, 
15 June 2006; B. van Stokkom, Mondig tegen elke prijs. Het vrije woord als fetisj, Den Haag: 
Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2008. 
33 Sokoloff and Lewis 2005, supra note 29.  
34Young 2006, supra note 7, pp. 198-199. 
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It is argued that it is in the interests of society and of the migrant, that their 
access to essential services is protected (e.g. emergency medical care, 
education for children). Hence, the integration strategy ought to be explicit 
on the minimum rights of undocumented migrants, with special attention for 
the protection at work in the event of irregular employment. For them, 
citizenship may initially be far-fetched, but anchoring their status into a social 
texture facilitates their acquaintance with a new culture and a new country. 
 
Which brings us to the question whether the European Union is paradoxical 
or even contradictory in its implementation of the integration policy. The 
issue of how to best integrate migrants is a core challenge throughout 
Europe as there are deep concerns about the rise of anti-semitism and 
Islamophobia, and about the increase of xenophobia and racism in general. 
Meanwhile also, the EU has taken tentative steps toward a common 
immigration policy (this not the same as a common integration policy, but 
they are strongly interdependent). It seems that Europe is struggling with 
three major tensions however. The first tension is its inherently ambivalent 
attitude to migration. The other is the domination of state sovereignty, which 
hinders the European Commission in taking this policy issue forward. The 
third tension is that it seeks to enhance internal security by excluding 
refugees that “do not deserve protection” and complying with international 
refugee protection standards and human rights. 
 
To begin with the first tension: the EU has fallen prey to the ambivalence, 
which surrounds the migration issue. Migrant labour is explicitly 
acknowledged as an essential complement to the European labour market, in 
order to balance the lack of unskilled and highly-skilled workers, and to 
counter the stagnation the growth of the European population whilst the 
demand for labour continues to rise.  A contrastive argument often ventured 
in the EU is that the inflow of migrant workers is seen as a major competitor 
from the point of view of domestic labour markets, mainly because they are 
seen as a threat to low-wage35 and low-skilled employment. 
 
This resistance enhances the chances for protectionism and has prompted 
several domestic debates about migration policies. In turn, the politicians 
have responded with more restrictive migration policies. The EU measures 
to fight illegal immigration have tended to overshadow the management of 
root causes of refugee flight, and the improvement of refugee protection in 
third countries, which has led to a lack of coherence between the EU 
measures to integrate migration issues into external policies and its human 
rights and development co-operation policies.36 
 
                                                
35 European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE),Broken Promises – Forgotten Principles: 
An ECRE Evaluation of the Development of EU Standards for Refugee Protection, Tampere 1999-
Brussels 2004, London/Brussels, 2005, p. 4. 
36 Idem, p. 5. 
8 TIME FOR DEMYSTIFICATION 2008 
The securitisation of migration control has resulted in the investment of 
increased budgets to raise the number of border guards, the strengthening of 
maritime surveillance, the use of surveillance equipment such as infra-red 
detection devices, and the use of biometric and fingerprinting equipment.37 
Illustrative is the creation of the EU Agency for the Management of External 
Border Controls, FRONTEX, which enjoys a gradual expansion of its 
mandate as well as its financial means. The ‘war on terror’ has pushed 
security concerns to the top of the agendas of all States; restrictions of the 
free movement of persons feature high on those.38 
 
The second tension – the domination of state sovereignty in a policy domain 
which is increasingly subject of internationalisation - is caused by the 
influence and power over policies concerning illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings still residing with the Member States. In the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council decides on those policy issues with unanimity.39 This remnant form 
of intergovernmental decision-making may thus be seen as an obstacle to 
progressive development and common policy approaches.40 Hence, whilst 
the EU has a mandate to issue legislative proposals concerning the 
harmonization of an EU immigration policy, the results have been limited 
thus far: the predominance of national politics, combined with resistance 
against further harmonization of immigration policies, has slowed down the 
legislative process.  
 
What remains is a vast divergence between national immigration policies, 
also when it concerns regularisation programmes and expulsion policies. 
                                                
37 Idem, p. 15. In its opinion which was published on 30 September 2005, the Working 
Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data (set 
up under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995), the huge amount of data on the body of a person which can be 
accumulated through the use of biometric features in passports, travel documents and 
identity cards can be a problem for immigrants, because they may “unjustly targeted under 
such a system, (…).” Opinion of the Working Party on the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States (OJ L 385, 29/12/2004, p. 1-6),  
p. 8. 
38 M. den Boer, ‘The EU Counter-Terrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound 
Policy Transformation?’, in: M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting Terrorism: European 
Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International 2003, pp. 
39 K. Hailbronner, ‘Asylum law in the Context of a European Migration Policy’, in: Neil 
Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004, p. 50: “There is a broad consensus that the principle of unanimity prevailing in 
immigration and asylum law must be considered as a major reason for the rather slow and 
frequently unsatisfactory legislative process.” 
40 S. Carrera, ‘Towards an EU Framework on the Integration of Immigrants’, in S. Carrera 
(ed.), The Nexus Between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU, Collective 
Conference Volume CHALLENGE, April 2006, p. 7. (http://www.ceps.be). 
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Pastore41 observes a “panorama of national normative frameworks on 
admission”; the approach was “extremely heterogeneous and marked by a 
deep divide between countries still formally adhering to a policy of ‘zero 
immigration’ and countries – particularly those in Southern Europe – with an 
explicit policy of economic migration.” Illustrative in this context was the 
political resistance expressed in The Netherlands, notably by our former 
Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration, concerning the regularisation 
programme in Spain. She argued that Spain was too liberal and discredited a 
common European approach to illegal immigration. Currently, the 
Netherlands faces a similar dilemma with the asylum-seekers who have 
passed the procedure without having been given an asylum status. 
 
From this it appears that the steps towards EU control of immigration 
matters have resulted in a less liberal immigration policy (fewer rights, 
freedoms and privileges for immigrants). “Successive developments since the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam have confirmed a tendency 
which was already previously evident: mutual recognition much more easily 
works ‘negatively’ (disfavouring immigrants, by generalising the effect of 
negative acts or provisions) than ‘positively’ (by generalising favourable 
effects).”42 Moreover, in EU Directives, the tendency is mainly towards 
compliance by immigrants with a series of restrictive conditions.43 References 
are made to the EU legislation concerning visa regulation and expulsion 
orders. Thus far, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has focused more 
on the development of repressive legislation concerning the control of 
irregular migration, than on regular migration.44 An unresolved but most 
pertinent issue to be addressed concerns the question whether EU 
immigration policy should be subject to the same standards of democratic 
and judicial control as national immigration policies. 
 
The third tension has surfaced particularly since 9/11, namely the EU’s 
attempt to enhance internal security by excluding refugees “who do not 
deserve protection” and its compliance with international refugee protection 
standards and human rights.45 Measures proposed to screen those suspected 
of terrorist involvement at an early stage include pre-entry screening, a strict 
visa policy, biometric data, enhanced co-operation between border guards, 
intelligence service, and immigration and asylum authorities. Although not a 
central issue in this article, this perspective has implied a shift from reactive 
to proactive law enforcement (more intelligence-based, more secret, with the 
aim to investigate radicalisation, recruitment and preparatory activities), and a 
                                                
41 F. Pastore, Visas, Borders, Immigration: Formation, Structure, and Current Evolution of 
the EU Entry Control System’, in: N. Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 109. 
42 Idem, p. 107. 
43 Carrera 2006, supra note 40, p. 7. 
44 Pastore 2004, supra note 41, p. 109. 
45 Particularly illuminating in this regard is the Commission Working Document ‘The 
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international 
protection obligations and instruments’, Brussels, 05.12.2001, COM (2001) 743 final. 
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spill-over from security politics into migration policy.46 Although the 
Commission fully and explicitly endorses the line of UNHCR that there 
ought to be “a scrupulous application of the exceptions to refugee protection 
available under current approach”, the door has been opened up for 
exceptions. As these exceptions are primarily imposed by the Member States 
themselves, there ought to be strict monitoring of the conditions under 
which these exceptions apply, certainly in the knowledge that the people who 
might become subject of such measures have no regular status or do not 
enjoy full citizen’s rights. In practical terms, the screening procedure implies 
that all asylum seekers will be channelled through an asylum procedure with a 
view to identifying possible suspects of crime(s); hence, asylum seekers will 
be “known and identified, their background thoroughly investigated in one 
or more interviews, and checked against all available information on 
countries, groups and events.”47 Viewed from this perspective, the EU 
counter-terrorism strategy has certainly bolstered its defensiveness rather 
than its inclusiveness. 
Although the European Commission has demonstrated sensitivity to the 
effects of the securitisation trend, the framing of migration as a security 
problem has become sheer irrevocable, particularly in relation to terrorism, 
and to a large extent in relation to transnational organised crime. One of the 
first trends it should counter, is the increasing presence of repressive 
migration policies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The EU can 
still invest more effort into preventive policies against illegal immigration, 
both in partnership with source countries, as well as by means of 
harmonizing admission policies, which have been presented as an effective 
tool of clandestine and irregular migration48. Moreover, the securitisation 
process should be subject to demystification, and in this regard it is 
instructive that Europol has recently issued reports that provide a detailed 
deconstruction of the organised crime threat, as well as the terrorism 
situation in the EU, indicating that although the threat of an Islamist terrorist 
attack in some countries has increased, the majority (88%) of all reported 
terrorist attacks are of a separatist rather than an islamist nature.49 
 
As noted above, an integration-based migration policy seeks to promote a 
regular status of migrants in European societies, thereby seeking to suppress 
marginalisation and radicalisation trends. Furthermore, the field of family 
reunification requires further development. EU free movement law applies to 
third-country nationals of all EU citizens, regardless of whether those 
nationals have exercised their free movement rights, and they could 
                                                
46 On this issue, see also M. den Boer (2006), ‘Fusing the Fragments: Challenges for EU 
Internal Security Governance on Terrorism’, in: D. Mahncke & J. Monar (eds.), International 
Terrorism. A European Response to a Global Threat?, College of Europe Studies No. 3, Brussels: 
Peter Lang Publishers; J. Sheptycki, ‘High Policing in the Security Control Society’, Policing, 
(1) 2007-1. 
47 European Commission 2001, supra note 45, p. 9. 
48 Pastore 2004, supra note 41, p. 111. 
49Europol, ‘Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2007’, 2008; TE-SAT EU Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report 2008. 
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eventually qualify for the status of long-term residents under EC legislation.50 
So far, so good, but it is argued that despite the fact that there is no hard 
evidence of racial discrimination, the Family Reunion Directive favours EC 
nationals above third-country nationals. Steve Peers interprets this as an 
unethical situation and claims that “many non-white people in the European 
Union cannot enjoy the human right to respect for their family life in the 
same way as the white majority, even if they are long-term residents of a 
Member State.”51 
 
However, an integration agenda imposed on the European citizens will not 
work if not supported by different actors throughout the European society. 
It is therefore crucial to advocate ownership of those integration policies, 
combined with commitment, engagement, resources, information and 
transparency. In addition, integration policies cannot be launched from 
Brussels with the expectation that local communities will implement them 
automatically. Therefore, a smart communication and implementation 
strategy is an absolute precondition to their success. Policy ownership cannot 
be achieved without “integration agents”, individual and institutional 
members of society who are genuinely committed to concrete achievements, 
and who are the essential catalysts in the transformation process. 
 
Integration agents need the solid loyalty and support from collective actors, 
such as the major institutions within the European Union. The European 
Commission can and must present a cross cutting policy agenda, 
demonstrating a comprehensive (holistic) approach to integration policy. 
“Courageous leadership” may be required to mobilise (and engage!!!) the 
different partners in civil society.52 The European Parliament is in the 
position to initiate, stimulate, endorse and monitor these initiatives. It is 
particularly well placed to encourage a comprehensive multi-tiered strategy, 
which includes integration in the labour-market, social inclusion, inclusion in 
civil life, equal opportunities and the building of good relations as well as 
facilitating an inter-institutional Declaration. The European Council 
underlines the need for greater coordination of national integration policies. 
 
Given the demographic developments, Member States of the EU and 
Schengen partners will soon have to acknowledge that immigration should 
not primarily be regarded as an exclusive, but as an inclusive issue; not so 
much as a divisive issue, but as a binding issue. For this, it is required that 
policy-making concerning integration will be increasingly shared at the 
international level and that it does not stop after the completion of the 
legislative process.53 
                                                
50 S. Peers, ‘Family Reunion and Community Law’, in: N. Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 151. 
51 Idem, p. 197. 
52 EPC and KBF, Issue paper 27, p. 11. 
53 J. van Selm, ‘The Enlargement of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Managing 
Migration in a European Union of 25 Members’, Policy Brief, Migration Policy Institute May 
2004-4, p. 11. 
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Concluding Comments  
 
A Europe, which cultivates segregation between the “haves” and the “have-
nots” in and between our own societies is undesirable as it may lead to a 
situation, which is worse than isolated terrorism. A Europe, which can no 
longer deny its growing need for immigrant labour might be able to return to 
former traditions of absorption and integration. Cities like Amsterdam, 
Cordoba and Istanbul are illustrative examples of rich and successful 
traditions of ethnic and cultural integration. This article has argued the need 
for a disentanglement between the migration and security discourse, as well 
as the need for perceptiveness of more nuanced interpretation of facts, 
numbers and statistics. Politicians, policy-makers and the media carry a 
special responsibility for this demystification strategy. The focus on Europe 
and international co-operation should certainly not overshadow the need for 
local action. Immigration and integration establish a dossier, which ought to 
be implemented in accordance with the subsidiarity principle: integration is 
primarily a subject for local communities, however, as immigration and 
asylum are transnational movements, the international and European policy-
making process may be a vital complementary dimension. 
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